GPG testing...
Travis Roy
travis at scootz.net
Mon Dec 30 08:10:03 EST 2002
This was EXACTLY my point as to why GPG/PGP for signing email is
currently flawed the way it works now.
> Case in point: This discussion originated as a discussion
> about using digital signatures to counter spam. Since
> digital signatures, on today's Internet, are relatively
> uncommon, they do not provide non-repudiation.
> Thus, digital signatures cannot be used to prove one did not
> send a given spam.
>
> Now, I am sure someone will say, "If you sign all your
> messages, then the unsigned spam will be suspect, because it
> lacks your digital signature."
>
> That again misses the most fundamental aspect of security:
> Security is entirely about trust. Someone sending
> illegitimate mail is, almost by definition, not to be
> trusted. Thus, if you are suspected of sending an
> illegitimate message, the fact that you nominally sign all
> your messages does not impart trust. Indeed, one who
> regularly traffics in illegitimate messages would be rather
> more likely to sign all their legitimate mail.
> Meanwhile, if you can, by other means, prove you are
> trustworthy, the digital signature becomes superfluous. We
> already know you are trustworthy;
> thus, we don't need a digital signature to know you did not
> send the illegitimate message.
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