"more secure" 3rd-party file sharing?

[Tom Buskey]

On 8/23/06, Ben Scott <dragonhawk at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 8/23/06, Bill McGonigle <bill at bfccomputing.com> wrote:
> >>  I know that fixing wetware makes the Microsoft patch process look
> >> easy, but ultimately, it is what is needed.  No matter what you do,
> >> you can't have a secure system with insecure people.  This is
> >> inescapable fact.
> >
> > you also can't have fool-proof people.  I wonder how the TLA's handle
> > this.
>
>   Are you referring to classified information security?
>
>   If you really want to know, much of it is documented in the NISPOM
> (National Industrial Security Program Operations Manual, available
> from http://www.dss.mil/isec/nispom.htm).  Along with the venerable
> NSA rainbow books (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rainbow_Series).  Most
> of it is really rather dull.


...

>   The procedural side of things might be more useful to you.  Again,
> not in the details, but in the concepts.  Regular briefings and
> training.  Lots of logs and audit trails and accountability.  To get a
> Security Clearance, you have to sign an NDA, take an oath, submit to a
> background investigation.  Security Is A Big Deal.  It is treated as
> an essential element, rather then a hassle.  Not the rubber stamp that
> corporate security usually is, but "You will go to Federal Pound Me In
> the Ass Prison if you screw off".


There's a clause about punishable by death too.  They look into your medical
records, interview your associates and relatives and especially look into
your financials.

It's a pain to admin classified environments (no yum update!  No google.)
Once a disk goes in, it doesn't come out so repairs can be problematic.


  If you get that kind of commitment, the human factors become
> manageable.  If you lack it, you'll probably never win.  Most
> organizations lack the commitment.  They reap what they sow.


A security expert once said: If you don't trust your people, fire them.
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